

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6416
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
JCS WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 KIGALI 1196

STATE ALSO FOR ACDA AND AID

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS,MPOL, XX
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 167901; (B) STATE 168320

SUMMARY: WHILE DOUBTFUL SUBJECT REPORTING REQUIREMENT
REALLY INTENDED FOR POSTS LIKE KIGALI, WHERE NO SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM NOW EXISTS, EMBASSY HAS ATTEMPTED TO
RESPOND WITH INFO WHICH IT BELIEVES IS GERMANE TO
RWANDA'S CONTINUING APPEAL FOR "NON-LETHAL" US MILITARY
AID. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE SUCH AID COULD BE PROVIDED
WITHOUT VIOLATING LARGER POLICY AIMS OF REDUCING ARMS
TRANSFERS TO LDC'S. WE FURTHER BELIEVE EVEN TOKEN
ASSISTANCE OF THIS TYPE COULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE OUR
LEVERAGE IN ACHIEVING OTHER US OBJECTIVES IN RWANDA,
NOTABLY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DOMAIN. PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR
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RWANDA BEGINS WITH IMETP TRAINING IN FY-80 (\$100,000);
CONTINUES IMETP AND ADDS MODEST FMS IN FY-81 (\$900,000);
AND AIMS AT EXPANDING INTO HEAVIER TRANSPORT FIELD IN FY-
81(\$1.5 MILLION). WE STRESS TWO POINTS: (A) WE DO NOT
RPT NOT RECOMMEND NOR FAVOR SUPPLYING ARMS OR OTHER
COMBAT-LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO GOR; AND (B) RWANDA'S POVERTY
SEVERLY LIMITS ITS ABILITY TO ACQUIRE MATERIAL ("NON-

LETHAL" OR OTHERWISE) ON ANY BUT SOFTEST CREDIT OR GRANT TERMS. END SUMMARY.

(1) AS IDENTIFIED IN KIGALI'S FY-77 PARM AND CONFIRMED IN ITS FY-78 GORM, US INTERESTS IN RWANDA ARE: (A) HUMAN RIGHTS - RECONCILIATION AMONG RWANDAN ETHNIC GROUPS WITH FULL RECOGNITION OF MINORITY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; (B) FOOD/POPULATION - IMPROVED RWANDAN CAPABILITY TO FEED ITSELF, THROUGH PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION AND DISCOURAGE POPULATION GROWTH; (C) COOPERATION WITH US ON REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES; AND (D) SUB-REGIONAL STABILITY - IMPROVED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM-SOLVING AMONG RWANDA AND ITS NEIGHBORS.

A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RWANDA AND THE US WILL MOST DIRECTLY SERVE THE LAST OF THESE INTERESTS, WHICH IS NOW THREATENED BY TENSIONS (NOTABLY WITH NEIGHBORING BURUNDI AND UGANDA) PARTLY ROOTED IN RWANDA'S OWN RELATIVE MILITARY WEAKNESS. HOWEVER, PROPERLY FOCUSED (AS WE URGE BELOW) ON DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE PLAYED BY RWANDAN ARMED FORCES, RELATIONSHIP WITH US WILL ALSO PROMOTE EACH OF OUR OTHER INTERESTS, PERHAPS THAT OF HUMAN RIGHTS MOST OF ALL.

OUR OBJECTIVES ARE NARROW AND LIMITED: BY HELPING TO CORRECT REGIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES, TO ENCOURAGE
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PROBLEM-SOLVING COLLABORATION BETWEEN RWANDA AND ITS NEIGHBORS; BY PROVIDING TOOLS AND TRAINING TO DO THE JOB, TO ENCOURAGE ARMY'S ALREADY IMPORTANT ROLE TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; AND BY DEMONSTRATING MATERIAL CONCERN FOR ARMY AS A KEY NATIONAL INSTITUTION, TO REINFORCE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CARRY FORWARD NATIONAL RECONILIATION AND BASIC HUMAN NEEDS PROGRAMS.

(2) RWANDAN GOVT, AND PARTICULARLY IT S SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS, ARE GREATLY CONCERNED AT RECENT SOVIET/CUBAN INROADS IN CENTRAL AFRICA. THEY FEAR A RESUMPTION OF TRAINING AND SUPPORT FOR EXILE GROUPS CAMPED BEYOND RWANDA'S BORDERS. THEY ARE WORRIED AT GROWING SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE IN BURUNDI, WHERE STRONG POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT WITH RWANDA EXISTS DUE TO INVERTED ETHNIC POWER BALANCE (MAJORITY HUTU DOMINATE IN RWANDA, WHILE MINORITY TUTSI REMAIN IN CONTROL IN BURUNDI). THEY FEAR EROSION OF FRIENDLY GOVT IN KINSHAS AND WEAKENING OF ITS CONTROL OVER ZAIRE'S EASTERN REGION ADJACENT TO RWANDA. AND THEY ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THEIR OWN FEEBLE MILITARY POSTURE DENIES RWANDA ANY VOICE IN ITS OWN SECURITY WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, NOT EVEN A SYMBOLIC DETER-

RENT. DEVELOPMENT, INSISTS THE GOR, CANNOT OCCUR
SUCCESSFULLY IN A CLIMATE OF FUNDAMENTAL INSECURITY.

(3) WHILE WE BELIEVE GOR EXAGGERATES SOVIET/CUBAN
DESIGNS AND OVERESTIMATES DANGERS OF BOTH EXILE INCURSIONS
AND MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS,
WE RECOGNIZE THAT IS PRECEPTIONS OF INSECURITY--WHICH
ARE VALIF ENOUGH IN TERMS OF REGIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES--
DIRECTLY EFFECT INTERNAL POLITICS AND GOR ABILITY TO
CARRY ON PRESENT FORWARD-LOOKING PROGRAMS. PRES.
HABYARIMANA, COMMITTED TO DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL REFORMS
WHICH COINCIDE CLOSELY WITH US INTERESTS, IS UNDER
GROWING PRESSURE FROM ARMY OFFICERS TO DEVOTE MORE
ATTENTION AND RESOURCES TO SECURITY QUESTION--ESPECIALLY
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ARM'S EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING NEEDS. WE BELIEVE THAT,
UNLESS HABYARIMANA RESPONDS TO THIS PRESSURE, HIS WORTHY
EFFORTS IN CIVILIAN SECTOR MAY BE JEOPARDIZED.

(4) GOR SEEKS ACROSS-THE-BOARD MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FROM ITS TRADITIONAL FRIENDS (ESPECIALLY BELGIUM, FRANCE,
WEST GERMANY, AND US), AND IT HAS ALSO INDICATED
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT HELP FROM LESS TRADITIONAL SOURCES,
NOTABLY LIBYA AND PRC. WHILE WEAK IN VIRTUALLY EVERY
MILITARY BRANCH, RWANDA HAS TAILORED ITS REQUESTS TO SUIT
INTERESTS OF POTENTIAL AID DONORS; FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE,
IS ENTRUSTED WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENDARMERIE,
BELGIUM WITH TRAINING ARMY CADRES, LIBYANS ARE PROVIDING
PARA-COMMANDO AND HELO TRAINING, AND FRG IS ASSISTING
WITH COMMO EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. US, WHOSE DESIRE TO
REDUCE ARMS TRANSFERS TO LDC'S IS RECOGNIZED AND UNDER-
STOOD, HAS SPECIFICALLY BEEN ASKED TO ASSIST IN
STRENGTHENING ARMY'S NON-COMBAT ROLE, BY PROVIDING DUAL
PURPOSE "NON-LETHAL" EQUIPMENT (TRUCKS, TRANSPORT AIR-
CRAFT, COMMO EQUIPMENT, ETC.) AND RELATED TRAINING. GOR
POSSESSES NO MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE CLASSED
AS "SOPHISTICATED" IN ANY SENSE; NOR, TO OUR KNOWELDGE,
DOES IT SEEK TO ACQUIRE ANY. ITS NEEDS ARE FAR MORE
ELEMENTAL.

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(5) EMBASSY BELIEVES GOR APPROACH TO STRENGTHENING
OVERALL SECURITY POSTURE WHILE REINFORCING ARM'S
DEVELOPMENT ROLE MAKES GOOD SENSE. GOR NEEDS HELP OF
VIRTUALLY EVERY SORT, AND SPLITTING ITS APPEALS TO DONORS
ALONG LINES OF LATTERS' PARTICULAR INTERESTS IS A REASON-
ABLE APPROACH (ALTHOUGH WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY
ITS RESORT TO SUPPLIERS UNFRIENDLY TO US). CERTAINLY,
CASE OF ITS APPROACH TO US, EMPHASIZING ARMY'S VERY
REAL POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
WHILE ALSO REINFORCING LOGISTICAL AND PATROL CAPABILITIES,
MESHERS WITH OUR DESIRE TO CORRECT OUR OWN "ARMS MERCHANT"
IMAGE.

MUST STRESS HERE, HOWEVER, THAT RWANDA'S KEY PROBLEM
LIES NOT IN NATURE AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY BUT IN ITS LACK
OF BUYING POWER. GOR APPEALS TO US AND TO OTHERS ARE
INVARIABLY COUCHED IN TERMS OF GRANT AID; ITS MEANS OF
FINANCING IMPROVEMENTS IN ITS SECURITY POSTURE THROUGH ITS
OWN RESOURCES ARE NEXT TO NIL. VIRTUALLY ALL PRESENT
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EXPENDITURES ON ARMED FORCES (SEE FOLLOWING PARA) ARE
LOCAL CURRENCY PAYMENTS FOR SALARIES AND MAINTENANCE.
IT WOULD BE VERY HARD-PRESSED TO REPAY EVEN CONCESSIONAL
LOANS FOR FOREIGN HARDWARE OR TRAINING.

(6) DEFENSE SPENDING, AMOUNTING TO \$14.1 MILLION IN
1978, IS 17 PERCENT OF ORDINARY NATIONAL BUDGET, DOWN FROM 19
PERCENT THE YEAR BEFORE. IT IS NOT MORE THAN 3 PERCENT OF GDP (FOR
WHICH NO RELIABLE RECENT FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE). MILITARY

IMPORTS ARE NOT PUBLISHED, BUT MUST BE SMALL, SINCE TOTAL BUDGET IS SMALL AND MOST EQUIPMENT IS OBTAINED THROUGH GRANTS FROM BELGIUM AND FRANCE. FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION IS AT MOST COMFORTABLE EVER: AROUND \$100 MILLION, EQUIVALENT TO MORE THAN NINE MONTHS' IMPORTS. EXTERNAL DEBT IS LOW, SINCE MOST FOREIGN AID IS ON GRANT BASIS AND GOVERNMENT RARELY SEEKS COMMERCIAL CREDITS.

(7) RWANDAN MILITARY DEL TRAVELED TO US IN JUNE 1977 TO PRESENT REQUEST FOR EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. WE INFORMED GOR IN DECEMBER THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEDE TO ITS REQUEST, BUT PRES. HABYARIMANA HAS SINCE ADVISED THAT REQUEST STILL STANDS AND GOR HOPES WE WILL REVIEW OUR DECISION. JUNE REQUEST CONSISTED OF FOLLOWING:

A. AIRCRAFT

2 C-130 TRANSPORT, FOR SHARED CIVILIAN/MILITARY USE

1 HELICOPTER, 7-SEAT, FOR ARMY HEALTH SERVICE (AMBULANCE)

2 HELICOPTERS, 5-SEAT, FOR BORDER PATROL (ANTI-BANDITRY)

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B. GROUND TRANSPORT

100 DIESEL TRUCKS, 5-TON

200 WILLYS JEEPS, SHORT CHASSIS, OF WHICH 50 RADIO EQUIPPED

20 AMBULANCES FOR ARMY HEALTH SERVICE

1. TANK TRUCK FOR HAULING KEROSENE

C. MEDICAL SUPPLIES (NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED) FOR ARMY HEALTH SERVICE.

D. LAKE TRANSPORT

5 PATROL BOATS, RADIO/RADAR EQUIPPED (ANTI-SMUGGLING)

20 INFLATABLE MOTOR BOATS, 10-PAX (ANTI-SMUGGLING)

E. COMMO EQUIPMENT

50 LONG-RANGE STATIONARY UNITS

50 LONG-RANGE PORTABLE UNITS

50 LONG-RANGE VEHICLE MOUNTED UNITS

75 SHORT-RANGE VEHICLE MOUNTED UNITS

15 TELETYPEWRITERS

F. ARMORED VEHICLES

10 WHEELED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

45 WHEELED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, RADIO-EQUIPPED AND ARMED
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G. TRAINING

TECHNICAL: AIRPLANE AND HELICOPTER PILOTS, AVIATION AND
HELICOPTER MECHANICS

PARACHUTISTS (INCL. INSTRUCTORS)

COMMUNICATIONS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

SECURITY: INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

LONG-TERM TRAINING AT US MILITARY SCHOOLS

STUDY AND ORIENTATION IN US FOR OFFICERS

(8) ASSISMENT OF REQUESTS. LIST IS EXTENSIVE BUT
COHERENT, AND IT IS ALTOGETHER CONSISTENT WITH GOR
STRATEGY TO APPEAL TO USG FOR ASSISTANCE WHICH WILL SERVE
DUAL PURPOSES OF ENHANCING ARMY'S "NATION-BUILDING" ROLE
WHILE STRENGTHENING SECURITY CAPABILITIES. ALTHOUGH SOME
ITEMS ARE EXPENSIVE, NONE COULD BE CLASSED AS "SOPHISTI-
CATED" NOR CAPABLE OF INTRODUCING TECHNICAL DISEQUILIBRIUM
INTO REGIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES. EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR
RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, ALL ADHERE TO GOR RESOLVE TO
ABSTAIN FROM REQUESTING "LETHAL" EQUIPMENT. ALL ARE ITEMS
NOW UNAVAILABLE OR IN CRITICALLY SHORT SUPPLY, BOTH TO
ARMY AND WITHIN CIVILIAN SECTOR. AND WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS
(SEE BELOW), NONE NOW APPEAR TO BE AVAILABLE TO GOR FROM
ANY OTHER SUPPLIER ON TERMS WHICH RWANDA CAN AFFORD.

A. AIRCRAFT. LANDLOCKED AND REMOTE, RWANDA SEES
"HERCULES" AS IDEAL SOLUTION TO MANY TRANSPORT PROBLEMS,
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MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. GOR HAS INDICATED ARMY WOULD HAVE TO SHARE WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES, WHICH NOW CHARTER COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT TO TRANSPORT COFFEE AND TEA (RWANDA'S TWO PRINCIPAL EXPORTS) TO INDIAN OCEAN PORTS. AT PRESENT, ARMY HAS ZERO AIRBORNE TROOP TRANSPORT CAPACITY. IT NOW HAS FIVE ALOUETTE HELICOPTERS, HAVING JUST BEEN SUPPLIED THREE BY LIBYA TO SUPPLEMENT TWO OLDER ONES (INCLUDING PRESIDENT'S PERSON HELICOPTER) PROVIDED BY BELGIUM.

B. GROUND TRANSPORT. RWANDA'S OVERRIDING TRANSPORT WORRIES ALSO EXPLAIN REQUEST FOR TRUCKS AND JEEPS. ALTHOUGH ARMY ACQUIRED SEVERAL DOZEN HEAVY TRUCKS SOME 3-4 YEARS AGO (MOSTLY MAGIRUS DEUTZ), EXTREMELY ROUGH RWANDAN ROADS HAVE NOW SIDELINED MAJORITY OF THESE. ARMY'S FEW JEEP-TYPE VEHICLES ARE NOW ALMOST ANTIQUES. JEEPS WOULD BE USED FOR RECONNAISSANCE AND (INEVITABLY) FOR ERRAND-RUNNING; HEAVY TRUCKS, LIKE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PERFORM DOUBLE DUTY, ASSISTING IN TRANSPORT OF CIVILIAN GOODS FOR OTHER GOR AGENCIES (ON REIMBURSABLE AND AS-AVAILABLE BASIS, ARMY TRUCKS NOW PROVIDE SUCH FOR GOR FOOD MARKETING BOARD).

NOTE BY OC/T: TELEGRAM DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA BY POUCH

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C. MEDICAL SUPPLIES. WHILE GOR REQUEST NON-SPECIFIC, RWANDAN ARMY WOULD TAKE AND MAKE USE OF ALMOST ANY NON-SOPHISTICATED MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IT COULD GET. UNDER BELIGAN ARMY TA SUPERVISION, RWANDAN MEDICAL CORPS NOW EXTENDS SPACE-AVAILABLE SERVICES OF BASE HOSPITALS AND CLINICS TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN NEIGHBORING AREAS AND EVEN CARRIES ON DISCREET CHILD-SPACING COUNSELING. GOR WISHES TO SEE ARMY FURTHER EXTEND THIS IMPORTANT AND POPULAR ROLE AROUND COUNTRY.

D. LAKE TRANSPORT. GOR IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY SMUGGLING WHICH OCCURS MAINLY FROM ZAIRE ACROSS LAKE KIVU. WITHIN TRIPARTITE COMMUNITY OF GREAT LAKES STATES (INCLUDING BURUNDI), IT IS COMMITTED TO SUPPRESSING THIS ACTIVITY BY LACKS MEANS TO DO SO. IT IS ALSO CONCERNED BY POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-GOR EXILE TRAFFIC ACROSS LAKE. PATROL BOATS WOULD AIM AT PROVIDING MEANS TO DELA WITH BOTH PROBLEMS ALONG EXPOSED 100-MILE WESTERN FLANK DEFINED BY LAKE KIVU.

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E. COMMO EQUIPMENT. RWANDA'S COMMUNICATION LINKS, INTERNALLY AND WITH OUTSIDE WORLD, ARE ALMOST AS WEAK AS ITS TRANSPORT. HOWEVER, FRG RECENTLY GRANTED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UPGRADE ARMY COMMUNICATIONS AND PERMIT ARMY NET TO SERVE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES AS WELL, LINKING PROVINCIAL CAPITALS WITH KIGALI. WE REGARD FRG AID AS NULLIFYING RWANDA'S REQUIREMENT FOR OUR HELP THIS SECTOR.

F. ARMORED VEHICLES. ONCE AGAIN, VEHICLES WOULD HELP SOLVE RWANDA'S DIFFICULT TRANSPORT SHORTAGES. ITS ARMY POSSESSES NO KNOWN OPERATIONAL VEHICLES OF THIS SORT. HOWEVER, "NON-COMBAT" USES FOR SUCH VEHICLES ARE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ENVISAGE, AND WE BELIEVE THEY COULD BE BETTER SUPPLIED BY OTHERS.

G. TRAINING. GOR'S PRIMARY TRAINING REQUESTS RELATE TO OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT WHICH IT ALSO SEEKS FROM US, PARTICULARLY OF AIRCRAFT WHICH IT IS NOW TOTALLY UNPREPARED TO SERVICE. WE SEE GREAT MERIT IN PROVIDING SUCH TRAINING AND REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL IN CONNECTION WITH ANY AIRCRAFT OR COMMO EQUIPMENT PROVIDED. PARATROOP TRAINING, ON OTHER HAND, IS NOW BEING PROVIDED BY LIBYANS (IN LIBYA), AND LIBYANS HAVE JUST INITIATED HELO OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TRAINING HERE; WE SEE NO BENEFIT FROM OUR COMPETING. FINALLY, WHILE WE SEE POLITICAL GAINS FROM LONG-TERM TRAINING OF RWANDANS AT

US MILITARY SCHOOLS, WE BELIEVE THIS ROLE ADQUATELY
AND MORE READILY PLAYED NOW BY BELGIANS AND FRENCH. WE
WOULD PUT OUR MONEY INSTEAD ON SHORT-TERM ORIENTATION
TRIPS AND PRACTICAL STUDY COURSES IN US, ESPECIALLY IN
LOGISTICAL, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, ENGINEERING, AND
MEDICAL FIELDS--AREAS IN WHICH RWANDAN SHORTAGES ARE
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KEENEST AND WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS SECURITY.

(9) AS INDICATED ABOVE, PARA FIVE, NOTWITHSTANDING
OUR EXPLANATIONS GOR IS LOOKING FOR GRANT RPT GRANT
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CONSIDERS ITSELF TOO POOR EVEN TO
SERVICE FMS CREDITS. ACTUALLY, ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC
SITUATION IS LESS DESPERATE THAN THAT, FOLLOWING TWO
YEARS OF WINDFALL COFFEE EARNINGS AND ACCUMULATION OF OVER
\$100 MILLION IN FX RESERVES. HOWEVER, AS COFFEE PRICES
DECLINE AGAIN, LONGER-TERM OUTLOOK IS DISMAL AT BEST AND
GOR IS RELUCTANT TO MORTGAGE FUTURE AGAINST PRESENT PUR-CHANCES, EVEN
IN FACE OF ITS OWN SECURITY ANXIETIES (ITS LATEST SOLUTION
HAS BEEN TO TURN TO PRC AND LIBYANS FOR GRANT
MILITARY AID). IN REQUESTING US HELP A YEAR AGO, GOR STRONGLY
ADVANCED ARGUMENT THAT DUAL-PURPOSE MATERIAL IT SOUGH FROM US
WOULD NOT DETRACT FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BUT IN FACT
ENHANCE MILITARY'S CONTRIBUTION. ADMITTEDLY, THIS ARGUMENT
GOES ONLY SO FAR, AS ARMY LACKS NOT ONLY EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO
SKILLS AND EVEN MANDATE TO CARRY ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ROLE ALONG-
SIDE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES; BUT ARMY DOES MAKE ITS OWN
CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL WELL-BEING, NOTABLY BY GROWING MUCH
OF ITS OWN FOOD, PROVIDING EXTESIVE MEDICAL SERVICES TO
CIVILIANS, PERFORMING BACK-UP TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES, SHARING IN ROAD MAINTENANCE TASKS, AND BUILDING PRIMARY
SCHOOLS FOR CHILDREN OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL.

(10 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. AID REQUESTED WOULD IF
ANYTHING TEND TO REDRESS PRESENT FORCE IMBALANCES IN
REGION, BUT IT FALLS FAR SHORT OF OBTAINING EVEN COMPARA-
BILITY WITH SOVIET-SUPPLIED UGANDA AND BURUNDI, NOT TO
MENTION ZAIRE. ON THE OTHER HAND, DEMONSTRATION OF
SUPPORT FOR RWANDAN MILITARY AND GESTURES INDICATING WE
DO NOT DISMISS ITS SECURITY WORRIES WITHIN THIS IMBALANCED
REGIONAL CONTEXT WOULD, IN OUR OPINION, HAVE POSITIVE
EFFECT OF REINFORCING GOR ABILITY TO DEAL PKEACEFULLY AND
CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH NEIGHBORS.

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(11) HUMAN RIGHTS. RECORD OF HABYARIMANA GOVT IS GOOD AND IMPROVING STEADILY UNDER US PRODDING. RWANDA'S HISTORY OF BLOODY REVOLUTION AND ETHNIC STRIFE SERVES AS BACKDROP FOR CURRENT EFFORTS BY GOR TO PUT FEUDS OF THE PAST TO REST AND ACHIEVE RCONCILIATION AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS. PRESENT REGIME HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR RETURN TO FULL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT (ALBEIT ONE-PARTY SYSTEM) BY END OF 1978. ITS ONLY POLITICAL PREISONERS ARE THOSE OFFICIALS OF FORMER REGIME WHO WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED SHORTLY AFTER HABYARIMANA TAKEOVER IN JULY 1973. BEST EXAMPLE OF CURRENT HR CLIMATE WAS GOR CO-SPONSORED COLLOQUIUM ON PROBLEMS OF "HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT" HELD AT NATIONAL UNIVERSITY EARLY THIS MONTH WITH REPS FROM SEVERAL OTHER FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WE BELIEVE MODEN ASSISTANCE TO RWANDAN MILITARY WOULD HELP ENCOURAGE OFFICERS' SUPPORT FOR ENLIGHTENED HABYARIMANA POLICIES.

(12) OTHER ASSISTANCE SOURCES. ECONMICALLY, US IS A MINOR BILATERAL DONOR IN A FIELY DOMINATED BY BELGIUM (\$23.5
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MILLION IN 1976), UN AND WORLD BANK AGENCIES (\$25 MILLION, COMMON MARKET (\$8.4 MILLION), PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ABOUT \$6 MILLION), CANADA (\$4 MILLION), AND SWITZERLAND (\$2.3 MILLION). UP TO NOW, US HAS PROVIDED NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHATEVER. AGAIN, BELGIUM HAS CARRIED PREDOMINANT-- BUT DIMINISHING-- BURDEN; FRANCE SUPPORTS GENDARMERIE; FRG PROVIDES COMMO EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING; LIBYA IS TRAINING PARACHUTISTS; AND PRC HAS RECENTLY AGREED TO PROVIDE MATERIAL AND TRAINING OF AN UNSPECIFIED NATURE. UNFORTUNATELY, EMBASSY INFO DOES NOT ALLOW US TO QUANTIFY ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM THESE SOURCES.

(13) COUNTRY PROGRAM.

(A. LEVELS 1 THROUGH 3 (MINIMUM, INTERMEDIATE, AND CURRENT): ZERO ALL CATEGORIES. (SINCE THERE IS NO CURRENT PROGRAM IN RWANDA, THESE LEVELS DO NOT APPLY.)
(B. INCREMENTAL LEVEL: \$100,000 FOR FY-80, TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR IMETP PROGRAM (PROFESSIONAL OFFICER TRAINING AND SHORT-TERM ORIENTATION VISITS TO US).
TRAINING PROGRAM TO EMPHASIZE PRACTICAL STUDIES WITH DUAL-PURPOSE APPLICATION: LOGISTICS, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICAL. ACTIVITY WILL DEMONSTRATE TO GOR THAT WE HAVE NOT DISMISSED ITS CONCERN OVER STRENGTHENING SECURITY CAPABILITY, WHILE EMPHASIZING OUR DETERMINATION TO REDUCE ARMS TRANSFERS TO LDC'S GENERALLY AND OUR HOPE THAT MILITARY WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NOT SUBTRACT FROM IT. FAILURE TO PROVIDE EVEN THIS TOKEN ASSISTANCE WILL (A) STRENGTHEN ARMY PRESSURE ON PRES. HABYARIMANA TO PAY LESS ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENT AND MORE TO SECURITY; (B) WEAKEN US INFLUENCE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OTHER OBJECTIVES IN RWANDA; AND (C) REINFORCE PRESENT TENDENCY TO SEEK MILITARY AID FROM ACTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO U.S.
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C. REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSEQUENT YEARS:

--\$900,000 FOR FY-81, TO BEGIN TO RESPOND TO GOR'S REQUEST FOR MATERIAL ASSISTANCE BEYOND IMETP ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN IN FY-80. EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED UNDER FMS (\$750,000) WOULD BE LIMITED TO DUAL-PURPOSE "NON-LETHAL" ITEMS INCLUDING HEAVY-DUTY TRUCKS, JEEPS, AMBULANCES, AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IMETP TRAINING (\$150,000) WOULD CARRY FORWARD ACTIVITY BEGUN IN FY-80, WITH NEW EMPHASIS ON MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT.

--\$1.5 MILLION FOR FY-81, TO CARRY FORWARD AND

EXPAND SOMEWHAT THE SUPPLY AND TRAINING RELATIONSHIP UNDERTAKEN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED (\$1.2 MILLION) WOULD REMAIN LIMITED TO THOSE ITEMS WHICH GOR CAN BE EXPECTED TO USE FOR DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS SECURITY PURPOSES, TO INCLUDE HEAVY EARTH MOVING EQUIPMENT, TANK TRUCKS, PATROL BOATS, AND SPARE PARTS. IMETP TRAINING (\$300,000) WOULD RETAIN ITS PRACTICAL EMPHASIS, WITH GREATER STRESS ON LONGER-TERM OFFICER TRAINING.

D. AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SAY THAT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN RWANDA AND SURROUNDING REGION WILL BE IRREPARABLY HARMED BY OUR FAILURE TO APPROVE PROGRAMS LISTED ABOVE. WHAT WE SHALL LOSE BY FAILING TO RESPOND IS THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE ON NON-SECURITY FRONTS. LEVERAGE OF PROPOSED ASSISTANCE TO RWANDAN SECURITY WOULD ALLOW US MUCH GREATER INFLUENCE IN PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS/ETHNIC RECONCILIATION; GRASS-ROOTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS AND HENCE GREATER STABILITY IN THE REGION. IT MUST BE ADMITTED TOO THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS WE MIGHT ACHIEVE THE SAME INFLUENCE WITH GOR, NOTABLY THROUGH MORE MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; TO DATE, HOWEVER, THOSE MEANS HAVE PROVEN CONFIDENTIAL

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FEEBLE AND GLACIALLY SLOW TO MATERIALIZE. MODEST "NON-LETHAL" MILITARY AID OF THE SORT PROPOSED, IF CLEARLY DISSOCIATED FROM WEAPONS TRANSFER PER SE, COULD GIVE OUR INFLUENCE A BADLY-NEEDED SHORT IN THE ARM WITHOUT DOING ANY VIOLENCE TO OUR LARGER GOAL OF REDUCING ARMS TRANSFERS TO COUNTRIES LIKE RWANDA.

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